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527s in a Post-Swift Boat Era: The Current and
Future Role of Issue Advocacy Groups in
Presidential Elections
Lauren Daniel*
I. INTRODUCTION
We resent very deeply the false war crimes charges [Senator John Kerry]
made coming back from Vietnam [in 1971 and repeated in the book Tour
of Duty.] [W]e think those have cast aspersion on [American veterans]
both living and dead. We think that they are unsupportable. We intend to
bring the truth to the American people. We believe that based on our
experience with him, he is totally unfit to be commander in chief.1
¶1

In 2004, U.S. Senator John Kerry was defeated by incumbent George W. Bush in
the race for the United States presidency by a margin of less than 2.5% of the popular
vote.2 Political pundits have offered numerous explanations for Kerry’s defeat: his
alleged flip-flopping on the Iraq War, his perceived lofty New England intellectualism,
and his reported lack of appeal to the influential Evangelical Christians on morality
issues.3 One of the most widely recognized reasons for Kerry’s 2004 loss, however,
credits the involvement of the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (Swift Boaters). Under their
tax-exempt status as a “527” organization,4 the group launched a highly visible publicity
campaign that focused on Kerry’s alleged dishonesty about his military service during the
*

Juris Doctor Candidate, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, 2005, Boston
College; Former aide to U.S. Senator John Kerry, 2006–2007.
1
This statement was issued in May 2004 by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, an outside advocacy 527
group that launched a negative publicity campaign against the 2004 Democratic presidential nominee,
Senator John F. Kerry. Robert J. Caldwell, Vietnam Still Echoes in 2004 Campaign, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., May 9, 2004, at G4.
2
FED. ELECTIONS COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTION 2004, at 5 (2004), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalelections2004.shtml.
3
See, e.g., Scarborough Country (MSNBC television broadcast Feb. 28, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR
3881354; Letters, Red, White, and Blue Review, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 6, 2004, at 14, available
at 2004 WLNR 21767765; Bhargavi Shiva, Why John Kerry Lost, HINDU (INDIA) FIN. TIMES LTD., Nov.
19, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 15488330.
4
As explained in Part I, the term “527” is used to reference political organizations that have registered
under § 527 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. § 527 (2006)). While a variety of groups, many of
which are created to promote the election or defeat of a particular political candidate, register under § 527,
the term “527” most often refers to those political groups which do not advocate for or against particular
candidates, but rather advocate for or against political issues. Such 527 groups were not regulated by the
Federal Elections Commission at the time of the 2004 election. While 527s that engage in issue advocacy,
on the one hand, and express candidate advocacy, on the other, are equally entitled to tax-exempt status
under the IRC, the latter are uniquely subject to fundraising and spending limits under the purview of the
Federal Elections Commission.
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Vietnam War and argued, as a result, that he was unfit for the Office of President of the
United States.5
Created under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),6 the Swift Boaters are
one of the many tax-exempt groups to have exploited gaping loopholes in campaign
finance regulations. The “527 loophole” exists because 527s that self-identify as “issue
advocacy” groups (i.e., those seeking to influence the public through advertisement with
respect to an issue, such as abortion, education, the environment, etc.) are not subject to
the federally mandated fundraising and contribution limits that are imposed on 527s that
self-identify as candidate and political committees (i.e., those that explicitly advocate for
or against a particular candidate). Thus, several 527s that engage in subtle yet discernible
advocacy for or against a particular political party or candidate have misleadingly
characterized themselves as “issue advocacy” 527s to dodge federal funding limits. Over
the past decade, 527 groups similar to the Swift Boaters, such as MoveOn.org Voter
Fund, the Media Fund, and America Coming Together, have successfully influenced
federal elections through high volumes of media advertisements while remaining
virtually free from regulation by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).7 While
campaign finance measures over the past decade have limited the contributions to and
expenditures of individuals, party committees, and political action committees (PACs),8
such measures leave the influential contributions of 527s largely unregulated.
As the 2004 presidential election demonstrated, 527s provide a vehicle through
which wealthy individuals can redirect limitless contributions that would otherwise be
subject to strict caps if received by political parties or individual candidates. The
pervasive activities of independent groups during the 2004 race have been described by
one scholar as detrimental to democracy given their circumvention of contribution limits
and full disclosure requirements.9 To deter 527s’ further circumvention of campaign
finance regulations, the FEC implemented a case-by-case analysis in late 2004 to
determine whether particular 527s should be treated more like PACs, which are subject to
moentary caps.10 These reforms were not, however, prophylactic. Instead, they held off
recharacterizing a 527 that engaged in express candidate advocacy as a PAC until after
the 527’s advertisement campaign had already been launched.11
While the landscape of campaign finance regulation has progressed towards more
candor and accountability, the remaining loopholes involving 527s undermine the
regulatory system and create a fairly unsupervised alternative for political contributions
5

See Dennis Chaptman, Negative Campaign Ads Contribute to Healthy Democracy, Political Scientist
Argues, U. WIS.-MADISON NEWS, Jan. 14, 2008, http://www.news.wisc.edu/14606.
6
I.R.C. § 527.
7
See Anthony Corrado, Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law, in NEW
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 7, 34 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2005).
8
A “political action committee” or “PAC” is defined as “[a]n organization formed by a special-interest
group to raise money and contribute it to the campaigns of political candidates who the group believes will
promote its interests.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004).
9
See Sara Tindall Ghazal, Regulating Nonconnected 527s: Unnecessary, Unwise, and Inconsistent with the
First Amendment, 55 EMORY L.J. 193, 193 (2006) (calling 527s “not healthy for democracy”).
10
See Paul S. Ryan, 527s in 2008: The Past, Present, and Future of 527 Organization Political Activity
Regulation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 471, 490 (2008) (citing Political Committee Status, Definition of
Contribution and Allocation for Separate Segregated Funds and Nonconnected Committees, 69 Fed. Reg.
68,056, 68,064–65 (Nov. 23, 2004)).
11
See id. at 492–93.
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and expenditures. Even so, in September 2009 the D.C. Circuit endorsed such laissezfaire treatment of 527s, declaring in Emily’s List v. FEC that the First Amendment
protects unlimited contributions to and spending by a 527 unless the 527 acts in direct
coordination with a particular candidate or party.12 Said differently, so long as the 527
group is not a candidate committee (e.g., Joe Smith for Congress) or a political party
committee (e.g., the Democratic National Committee), the decision in Emily’s List states
that a 527 can expressly advocate for a candidate without subjection to federal funding
limits. The decision legitimizes the “527 loopholes” and greatly impedes regulation of
527s’ unlimited use of funding and spending. And though 527s may not coordinate
directly with campaigns by giving money to the campaign or by allowing the committee
to control the 527s’ funds,13 the story of the Swift Boaters and the 2004 election reveal
that explicit advocacy for or against a candidate need not be coordinated to have a
dramatic impact.
Notably, 527 groups played a smaller role in the 2008 presidential election than
they did in the 2004 elections. This Comment explores the diminished role 527s played
in the 2008 presidential election in comparison to the 2004 race, and argues that the
decline of 527 activity in 2008 is primarily attributable to the recent economic downturn,
rather than evidence of a permanent shift in the political activity of outside groups. This
Comment contends that the decline of 527s is a fleeting phenomenon which will soon
give way to a revival of unregulated, unscrupulous independent activity, especially given
the 2009 D.C. Circuit decision in Emily’s List v. FEC,14 which prohibits any imposition
of funding limits on outside 527s. In order to ensure transparency and fairness in
political campaigns, the FEC must, with the renewed blessing of the judiciary, impose
stricter and more lucid standards to determine which 527s are, in fact, outside issue
advocacy groups and which 527s are disguised political committees that engage in
candidate advocacy yet avoid the required contribution and spending caps. Part II will
explore the evolution of 527s, along with their function and legal status as recognized by
the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the FEC. Part III will examine the great
impact that 527s had on the 2004 presidential election, particularly the effect that the
Swift Boaters had on the defeat of Democratic nominee John Kerry. Part IV will discuss
the steps Congress took after 2004 to tighten loopholes in 527 regulation. Assessing the
efficacy of such actions, Part V will explore the apparent reduced role of 527s in the 2008
presidential election. Next, Part VI will survey the reasons behind the decline of 527
activity in 2008. Here, the probable ramifications of Emily’s List will also be
examined.15 In conclusion, Part VII will argue that any reduced activity among 527s in
2008 can be largely attributed to the economic recession that coincided with the 2008
presidential race rather than to any paradigmatic shift among outside groups. In essence,
12

See generally 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
This issue of what conduct constitutes “coordination” with political committees was addressed in
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 106 (2003): “FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that expenditures
that are controlled by or coordinated with a candidate will be treated as contributions to the candidate.
BCRA § 214(a) extends that rule to expenditures coordinated with political parties; and §§ 214(b) and (c)
direct the FEC to promulgate new regulations that do not ‘require agreement or formal collaboration to
establish coordination,’ 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) note. FECA § 315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is not overbroad simply because
it permits a finding of coordination in the absence of a pre-existing agreement. Congress has always
treated expenditures made after a wink or nod as coordinated.”
14
Emily’s List, 581 F.3d 1.
15
Id.
13
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outside groups—whether in the form of a 527, 501(c), or other classification—will
continue to circumvent campaign finance regulations by using unregulated money to
indirectly support the election or defeat of federal candidates until the FEC requires such
groups, with the acquiescence of the judiciary, to automatically register as “political
committees” subject to strict caps on fundraising and spending. The FEC’s current caseby-case analysis waits for 527s to exploit loopholes before such 527s are deemed
“political committees” and subjected to monetary caps. Beyond creating unpredictability
and little deterrence for future malfeasance, this “wait-and-see” policy leaves the door
wide open to an even greater rise in outside group involvement in presidential elections.
II. THE RISE OF THE 527
A. Overview
¶6

¶7

The term “527” is derived from the section of the IRC that governs their activity as
organizations for which contributions are not taxed.16 Enacted in 1975, § 527 of the IRC
covers organizations that primarily conduct election-related activity, defined as
“influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or
appointment of any individual to any federal, state, or local public office.”17 By this
definition, candidate committees and PACs are technically 527s; however, references to
this IRC section most commonly refer to the unique outside groups that are generally not
regulated by the FEC due to their presumed abstention from express candidate advocacy
in federal elections. For the purpose of this Comment, the term “527” exclusively refers
to non-PAC and non-candidate outside advocacy groups that, at least ostensibly, advocate
for and against political issues instead of particular federal candidates or parties.
Traditionally, 527s have been considered non-profit organizations that coordinate
voter registration or turnout drives, as well as campaign on specific issues. When § 527
of the IRC was initially enacted in 1975, Congress did not require independent political
organizations to itemize their expenditures or contributions with regard to political
activity.18 Instead, Congress relied on the FEC to monitor 527 disclosures on the basis of
the groups’ political nature.19 However, the 1976 Supreme Court decision of Buckley v.
Valeo created a loophole that allowed 527s to circumvent the Federal Elections
Campaign Act (FECA),20 which mandated disclosure and reporting by political
committees involved in federal elections and limited political contributions made by
individuals.21 The landmark decision of Buckley allowed 527s to dodge FEC regulation
by avoiding the use of particular advocacy-related words in their advertisements that
would trigger FEC supervision.22 While Buckley upheld portions of FECA limiting
16

I.R.C. § 527 (2006).
§ 527(e)(2).
18
See Frank J. Favia, Jr., Enforcing the Goals of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Silencing Nonprofit
Groups and Stealth PACs in Federal Elections, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1081, 1086–90 (2006).
19
Id.
20
The FECA was adopted in 1971 and later amended in 1974 to include limiting political contributions
made by individuals. 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (West 2010).
21
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1976). It is important to note that the debate about the restrictions
on free speech and campaign finance reform, which is at the core of the Buckley decision, is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
22
See id. at 44 & n.52 (explaining that express advocacy includes statements that “in express terms
17
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individual contributions and mandating disclosures, it struck down limitations on
campaign expenditures by individuals, groups, and campaigns, as well as personal
expenditures by candidates, on the grounds that such caps unduly restricted free speech
and the right to association.23
¶8
The Buckley decision also articulated that the touchstone for characterizing
“political committees” under FECA is whether “the major purpose” of the organization is
“the nomination or election of a candidate.”24 In doing so, the Court excluded
organizations concerned with issue advocacy from the FECA requirements that: (1)
political committees disclose its contributions and expenditures,25 and (2) that individual
contributors to political committees submit to a $5000 contribution cap per year.26 Issue
advocacy groups are those groups that solicit the public’s vote on particular issues, such
as immigration, education, reproductive rights, etc., rather than particular candidates.
¶9
In an effort to avoid FEC oversight, 527s would ostensibly channel their
contributions toward political issues—rather than explicit candidate advocacy—by
tactically avoiding FEC trigger words, such as “vote for” and “don’t elect,” as articulated
in Buckley.27 Thus, for example, instead of airing commercials that state “not to vote” for
a particular candidate, a pro-life 527 organization that is aligned with a particular
candidate might disseminate information regarding the opponent’s support of “killing of
helpless babies” through the commercial. Though the commercial clearly advocates
against a particular candidate, these groups manage to avoid contribution caps and
disclosure requirements under FECA by not using words such as “vote for” or “don’t
elect.”28 This strategy allows 527s to significantly impact political campaigns through
millions of dollars in television advertisements and other publicity channels while
remaining virtually free from regulation.29
¶10
At the time of its enactment, § 527 of the IRC sought to make clear that
contributions to politically affiliated organizations and committees were not subject to
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office . . . containing express
words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith
for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject’”).
23
Id. at 44.
24
Id. at 79.
25
2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (2006).
26
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(c) (2006).
27
Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 957
(2005).
28
To further illustrate this point, suppose candidate Joe Smith sponsors a television ad that frames his
opponent, John Doe, as a mouthpiece for special interests. At the end of the advertisement, the following
words appear on the screen: “Government should serve your interests, not special interests. Vote against
John Doe.” A 527 organization that favors Joe Smith’s candidacy and opposes John Doe is permitted to
run the very same advertisement so long as it omits the word “vote,” even though the ad conveys such
words by inference. Since the former advertisement is run by a political committee or campaign,
disbursements that went toward creating the ad will be regulated and capped at the $3000 limit in
accordance with BCRA. Donations that went into creating the latter commercial will remain unregulated
since these groups have been characterized as issue-based and not as explicit advocates of any particular
candidate or political party. However, both advertisements send the same message to the public: John Doe
is unfit for office. For a similar example, see Brandi Cherie Sablatura, Reformation of 527 Organizations:
Closing the Soft Money Loophole Created by the Bipartisan Campaign Act of 2002, 66 LA. L. REV. 809,
826–27 (2006).
29
Fredrick G. Slabach, Introduction to Campaign Finance Law and Organization of Materials, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: AN ANTHOLOGY 3, 10–13 (Fredrick G. Slabach ed.,
2006).
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income tax.30 However, it was not until 1998 that the IRS declared in a private letter
ruling that issue-advocacy groups (e.g., groups concerned with advocating for a single
issue of public concern, such as the environment, same-sex marriage, and the promotion
of gun control) were not within the FEC’s purview, and were thus eligible to register with
the IRS under § 527 of the IRC rather than with the FEC.31 This declaration broke with
past practices which required that any group possessing political affiliations or objectives
register with the FEC and disclose all financial contributions. The IRS’s ruling held that
527s would not be subject to the same disclosures required of PACs or candidate
committees, groups that openly advocate for the election of a particular candidate with
words like “vote for” or “don’t elect.” The IRS’s 1998 announcement allowed for a
substantially more lax registration process than that under other sections creating taxexempt entities.32
¶11
In 1998, the Sierra Club became the first large independent political group to
organize under section 527.33 Immediately after the IRS’s approval of the club’s status,
an influx of 527 organizations followed.34 Standing under § 527 was appealing on many
levels. First, all contributions to 527s were free from taxation. Second, compliance with
the arguably rigorous registration requirements under FEC was not required. Lastly, 527s
could work to reinforce the messages already disseminated by political campaigns while
avoiding public disclosure of either the sources or beneficiaries of 527 expenditures.35
¶12
The lack of transparency required by 527s in comparison to other politicallyaffiliated organizations led to an emergence of what was termed “stealth PACs.”36
Second only to state and national political party committees, 527s became the primary
sponsors of political issue advertisements—many of which were undeniably linked to
advocacy for a particular candidate.37
B. 2000 Reporting to the IRS
¶13

In response to the surge of 527 advertising in the 1998 midterm congressional
elections, Congress amended § 527 of the IRC to require outside organizations to disclose
expenditures and submit various reporting information to the IRS in 2000.38 This
amendment did not, however, include the imposition of contribution or spending limits
30

Albert L. May, Swift Boat Vets in 2004: Press Coverage of an Independent Campaign, 4 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 66, 76 (2005).
31
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999); see also Richard Kornylak, Note, Disclosing the
Election-Related Activities of Interest Groups Through § 527 of the Tax Code, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 230,
245 (2001).
32
David M. Peterson, Do the Swift Boat Vets Need to MoveOn? The Role of 527s in Contemporary
American Democracy, 84 TEX. L. REV. 767, 773 (2006).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See General Public Political Communications Coordinated with Candidates and Party Committees;
Independent Expenditures, 65 FED. REG. 76,138, 76,142 (Dec. 6, 2000) (codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 109,
110).
36
May, supra note 30, at 77.
37
Shayla Kasel, Show Us Your Money: Halting the Use of Trade Organizations as Covert Conduits for
Corporate Campaign Contributions, 33 J. CORP. L. 297, 310 (2007) (citing Kathleen Hall Jamieson et al.,
Introduction to ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., ISSUE ADVERTISING IN THE 1999–2000 ELECTION CYCLE 4
(2001), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Political_Communication/
IssueAdvocacyIn19992000Election/2001_19992000issueadvocacy.pdf).
38
I.R.C. § 527 (2000), amended by Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000).
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on 527 money. Since the FEC maintains exclusive jurisdiction over entities that engage
in express political advocacy (i.e., “vote for candidate X, not Y”), and 527s were
strategically characterizing themselves as mere issue advocates (i.e., “support
comprehensive education reform, which candidate X incidentally endorses”), such
outside groups fell just outside of the FEC’s reach.39
¶14
After 2000, 527s were subject to disclosure with the IRS—a process comparably as
rigorous as filing with the FEC. The IRS mandates that 527s elect to submit either
monthly or quarterly reports during an election year, along with a special report due
twelve days prior to an election.40 The new disclosure requirements also sought to make
information about both financial disbursements and leadership officers in 527s more
accessible to the public.41 To achieve this end, the IRS required organizations to register
with the government at least twenty-four hours prior to formation and provide the names
and contact information for organization officers.42 Independent organizations were also
required to disclose the names of individual contributors who had given more than $200
in a calendar year.43 To deter noncompliance, Congress even went so far as to tax all
unreported 527 contributions above $200 at the highest corporate tax rate.44
¶15
The constitutionality of these public disclosure requirements were subsequently
upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States.45
Legislators saw such requirements as the end of the “stealth PAC” and a deterrent to
unregulated campaign activity by 527s.46 However, while the disclosure requirements
mandated by the IRS made information regarding 527s sufficiently accessible to the
public, they did not address the fact that individuals could give limitless contributions to
527s to avoid the caps placed on candidate committees and PACs. The donors’
information became more transparent, but no efforts were made to limit their
contributions.
¶16
The lack of 527 oversight thus appears to stem not from a lack of disclosure
requirements, but rather from an absence of the contribution and expenditure limits that
control political parties and candidates committees.
C. 2002 Campaign Finance Reform Measures: The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
¶17

The advent of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)47
underscored the shortcomings of 527 regulation and became a catalyst for bringing
independent groups back to the forefront of the campaign finance debate. BCRA
39

See Kornylak, supra note 31, at 249.
See Internal Revenue Service, Pre-Election Reporting Dates,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/political/article/0,,id=118835,00.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
41
Peterson, supra note 32, at 774.
42
Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 527
(2006)).
43
Id.
44
See I.R.C. § 527(j)(1) (2006). Public Law 106-230 imposes the highest corporate tax rate—currently
thirty-five percent—on organizations failing to comply with the law's disclosure requirements. Pub. L. No.
106-230, § 1(c), 114 Stat. at 479 (2000) (codified at I.R.C. § 6652 (2006)).
45
353 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2003).
46
Peterson, supra note 32, at 774.
47
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2006)). The Act
is also known by the name “McCain-Feingold” after its Senate sponsors.
40
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instituted a mandate on all 527 advertisements to disclose the source of funding for such
advertisements that picture or reference specific candidates within sixty days of a federal
general election, or thirty days before a primary or nominating convention.48 This
“electioneering communications” provision applied to all political advertisements,
regardless of their characterization as “issue” or “express” advocacy and required reports
disclosing expenditures for the ads and a list of contributors who financed the ads to be
filed with the FEC.49
¶18
BCRA also overhauled campaign finance to eliminate the contribution of “soft
money”—money unregulated by the FEC—to candidates and political parties on the
local, state, and national levels.50 BCRA did not, however, eliminate or even limit the
contribution of soft money to 527s.51 The reform measures omitted traditional 527s from
the categorization of “political committee[s],” which are defined as “any committee, club,
association, or other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess
of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of
$1,000 during a calendar year.”52 Even though most traditional 527s appear to fit this
definition, since such groups receive the requisite $1000 annually and mainly seek to
influence federal elections, the FEC chose not to treat 527s as “political committees”
under BCRA.53 This is because money spent by 527s on political advertising was, and is,
deemed unassociated with political campaigns or candidates. Thus, 527 expenditures
were viewed as independent financing outside the purview of BCRA. The result was that
while political party committees were banned from raising or spending any funds not
subject to federal limits under any circumstances, 527s were permitted to freely collect
and spend unlimited soft money.
¶19
Much of the exclusion of 527s from BCRA’s ban on soft money traces back to the
Buckley decision’s pronouncement that an organization does not fall within the definition
of “political committee” unless its “major purpose” is to influence federal elections.54
While 527s had undeniably been influencing the outcome of recent federal elections
through issue advocacy which avoided use of Buckley’s “magic words,” they were still
considered entities separate from “political committees.” After the enactment of BCRA,
527s stood in the unique position of being able to accept soft money that political
candidates and parties were barred from receiving.55
¶20
Congress is undoubtedly faced with a conflict of interest in regulating the 527s that
both help and hinder congressional reelection campaigns. Few can disagree that these
outside organizations have grown into strikingly significant entities that were far from
congressional contemplation in the early 1990s.56 While Congress may have foreseen
48

2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2006); see also Court Cases: McConnell v. FEC, FEC RECORD, Jan. 2004, at 4,
available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/record/2004/jan04.pdf.
49
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 189–94 (2003); see also Court Cases, supra note 48, at 4–5.
50
Sablatura, supra note 28, at 825–826.
51
Id. at 826.
52
2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2006).
53
Sablatura, supra note 28, at 826.
54
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
55
Sablatura, supra note 28, at 828.
56
See David D. Storey, The Amendment of Section 527: Eliminating Stealth PACs and Providing a Model
for Future Campaign Finance Reform, 77 IND. L.J. 167, 182–84 (2002) (stating that Congress initially, and
incorrectly, thought when it permitted 527s to qualify as tax-exempt entites that such groups would
ultimately be subject to FECA dislocsure requirements).
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527s as tax-free entities that would stand on the periphery of political campaigns as they
advocated for single issues of public concern or conducted get-out-the-vote efforts, it is
improbable that anyone could have predicted the vital role these groups would play in
candidate advocacy by 2004.
¶21
BCRA’s ban on soft, or unregulated, money was upheld as constitutional in
McConnell v. FEC, despite Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent which argued that a limit on
donations to outside groups was a hindrance to a candidate’s right to free speech.57 Just
as FECA did not address 527s, so too did BCRA fail to tighten the regulation of 527s in
any regard. While the reform measure achieved its goal of banning unregulated
donations from corporations, wealthy individuals, and labor unions towards candidate
committees and PACs, it did not address the role of outside issue-focused organizations.
Unlike the $2,000 limit placed on individual contributions to political candidates and
committees, wealthy donors could make limitless contributions to 527s to achieve a
similar result. As a result of BCRA, independent groups did, in fact, emerge as a primary
conduit for soft money.58
¶22
The reason that 527s created such a viable alternative to direct candidate
contributions was because these groups could convey essentially the same message to the
public as the candidates themselves while avoiding almost any contribution limit.
Additionally, 527s play a vital role in disseminating negative campaign messages since,
by doing so, these groups allow candidate committees to refrain from negative
campaigning while still publicizing the negative message. In other words, 527s do the
“dirty work” of attack ads so candidates can distance themselves from such
communications and keep their messages to the public positive.
III. THE ROLE OF 527S IN 2004
¶23

The failure of federal regulation of outside groups rendered the 2004 presidential
election host to the largest proliferation of 527s to date. Two of the most strident and
effective voices among the independent groups were the conservative Swift Boaters and
the liberal MoveOn.org Voter Fund.59 Both groups utilized the internet and airwaves to
influence the electorate’s impressions of Kerry and Bush, respectively,60 and emerged as
pivotal players in candidate advocacy by avoiding the magic words articulated by the
Court in Buckley. While Swift Boaters attacked the verity of Kerry’s personal accounts
of serving in Vietnam,61 MoveOn.org Voter Fund accused Bush of “draft-dodging”
during Vietnam.62 The ability of 527s to collect multi-million dollar donations from
57

540 U.S. 93, 251 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[G]overnment bent on suppressing speech, this mode of
organization presents opportunities: Control any cog in the machine and you can halt the whole apparatus.
License printers, and it matters little whether authors are still free to write. Restrict the sale of books, and it
matters little who prints them. Predictably, repressive regimes have exploited these principles by attacking
all levels of the production and dissemination of ideas.”).
58
Peterson, supra note 32, at 774–75.
59
Id. at 775.
60
See Michelle Goldberg, MoveOn Moves Up, SALON, Dec. 1, 2003,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2003/12/01/moveon/index.htm.
61
Andrea Stone, Fog of War, Partisanship Clouds Kerry’s Record, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 2004, at 8A,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/president/2004-08-19swiftboat_x.htm.
62
Mark Memmott, New Ad Accuses Bush of Allowing False Advertising, USA TODAY, Aug. 16, 2004, at
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single donors allowed organizations like Swift Boaters and MoveOn.org Voter Fund to
significantly impact the public’s perception of candidates through the influence of media
outlets, such as television and radio advertisements.63
¶24
Perhaps the most disconcerting fact about 527 candidate advocacy is that most 527
advertising during the 2004 election was comprised of negative attacks often involving
“blatant misrepresentations and falsities” about opposing candidates.64 For example, the
liberal-leaning Media Fund erroneously claimed in a radio ad that family members of
terrorist Osama Bin Laden were allowed to depart the United States by plane “when most
other air traffic was grounded” after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001; however,
commercial air traffic had actually resumed the week earlier.65 On the other side, the
conservative National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund aired a television ad
falsely claiming that Kerry voted to ban deer hunting ammunition when, in fact, he voted
to outlaw rifle ammunition “designed or marketed as having armor piercing capability.”66
¶25
In total, 527 groups dedicated more than $430 million to the 2004 federal
elections.67 Most of these resources were directed toward independent advertising in
battleground states, such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida.68 Tellingly, a Public
Opinion Strategies study determined that two of the three most influential political
advertisements that aired in battleground states in 2004 were funded by the Swift Boaters
and the Progress for America Voter Funds, not by candidate campaigns or PACs.69 The
Swift Boaters’ attacks ads criticizing Kerry’s service in Vietnam and his receipt of
medals of honor were remembered by seventy-five percent of television viewers
surveyed.70 The pro-Bush Progress for America commercial, which featured a sixteenyear-old girl whose mother was killed during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
ranked second in terms of viewer recollection.71
A. Democratic-Affiliated 527s
¶26

The efforts of MoveOn.org Voter Fund, a 527 offshoot of the 501(c)(4)
MoveOn.org,72 proved significant in advocating against the election of George W. Bush.
MoveOn.org Voter Fund declared on its website its primary purpose was to “run ads

10A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/2004-08-16-ad-watch_x.htm.
63
Peterson, supra note 32, at 775 n.60 (noting that George Soros contributed over twenty-four million
dollars to nine different 527s during the 2004 election cycle).
64
Sablatura, supra note 28, at 814.
65
Factcheck.org, Media Fund Twists the Truth More Than Michael Moore (Oct. 27, 2004),
http://www.factcheck.org/article294.html.
66
Factcheck.org, NRA Ad Falsely Accuses Kerry (Oct. 28, 2004),
http://www.factcheck.org/article296.html.
67
OpenSecrets.org, 527s: Advocacy Group Spending in the 2010 Elections,
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/index.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
68
See, e.g., Ghazal, supra note 9, at 198 n.43; Matthew Murray, D.C. Democrats Launch Big 527, ROLL
CALL, Nov. 12, 2007.
69
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Thomas B. Edsall, At the End, Pro-GOP ‘527s’ Outspent Their Counterparts,
WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2004, at A6.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from federal income taxation not-for-profit civic
leagues, social welfare organizations, and local associations of employees. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).
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exposing President Bush’s failed policies in key ‘battleground’ states.”73 Attracting
support from high-profile Democratic partisans, the 527 was heavily funded by
Hungarian-born financier George Soros who donated a reported $2.6 million to the
organization.74 Soros explained on CNN’s American Morning his reasons for selecting
527s as his primary political mouthpiece75:
Well, I fund organizations that bring out the vote and, of course, they have
a certain bias. There’s no question about it . . . [I] felt that in 2004, the
greatest benefit that I could bring to humanity was to prevent [President
Bush’s] reelection . . . I was willing to, you know, go out, and I put my
money on the line, and I put my mouth where my money was [sic]. I
spoke out against him. And I think that events have kind of validated that,
in fact, we would be in a much better place if he had not been reelected.76
¶27

In the same corner as the Voter Fund was the progressive 527 America Coming
Together (ACT). Outfitted to “lead the fight against George Bush’s radical right-wing
agenda,”77 ACT was largely funded by insurance mogul Peter Lewis, who poured into
ACT an astounding $3 million.78 Similarly, the progressive Media Fund—also largely
funded by wealthy individuals—spent over $54 million to air anti-Bush advertisements.79
Perhaps the most notable of these broadcasts was a radio ad which sought to corroborate
popular criticism that the Bush family had close ties with the Saudi royal family,
particularly during the time of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.80
B. Republican-Affiliated 527s

¶28

While liberal 527s active in the 2004 presidential election were quicker to form and
raise capital than their conservative counterparts, right-wing groups ultimately produced
effective publicity campaigns and, at points during the election, out-spent Democratic
527s on radio and television ads by as much as six-to-one.81 Perhaps the most
memorable among 2004 independent attacks were those launched against Senator John
73

Benjamin S. Feuer, Between Political Speech and Cold, Hard Cash: Evaluating the FEC’s New
Regulations for 527 Groups, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 925, 928 (2006).
74
Center for Public Integrity, Silent Partners: MoveOn.org Voter Fund, 2004 Election Cycle,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/profile.aspx?act=dir&id=682&cycle=2004&sub=1 (last visted Feb. 17,
2010). Soros has been depicted on Saturday Night Live, a late-night sketch comedy show, as the “owner”
of the Democratic Party. George Soros is Interviewed on CNN’s American Morning (CNN television
Broadcast Oct. 22, 2008) (transcript on file with CQ Capital Transcripts) [hereinafter Soros Interview].
75
Soros Interview, supra note 74.
76
Id.
77
Feuer, supra note 73, at 928.
78
OpenSecrets.org, America Coming Together: Top Contributors, 2004 Cycle,
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail_contribs.php?ein=200094706&cycle=2004 (last visited
Feb. 5, 2010).
79
Michael J. Ushkow, Comment, Judicial Supervision of Campaign Information: A Proposal to Stop the
Dangerous Erosion of Madison’s Design for Actual Representation, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 299 (2005).
80
Id.
81
Thomas B. Edsall, After Late Start, Republican Groups Jump Into the Lead, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2004,
at A15. The article also quoted a Democratic public policy strategist as stating that Republican 527s “have
developed ‘messages that inherently have more leverage than others because they go at something that is at
the heart of the campaign’—in this case Kerry’s use of his military record.” Id.
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Kerry by the conservative Swift Boaters, who accused Kerry of having lied about the
details of his service in Vietnam to receive combat medals.82 Just three months before
the presidential election, the group began a vehement attack campaign throughout the
remaining few months of the 2004 presidential election and dominated media coverage of
the campaign in August and September of 2004.83 Largely funded by T. Boone Pickens,
a Texas oilman and influential Republican donor, Swift Boaters were comprised of
Vietnam Veterans alleged to have served on “swift boats” (small, lightly-armed patrol
boats) with John Kerry during the Vietnam War.84 The collection of veterans claimed
that Kerry fabricated accounts of his service and his conduct during enemy attacks in
order to receive one of his two decorations for bravery and two of his three Purple
Hearts.85 However, while many of the Swift Boaters had served in Vietnam, few had ever
even met Kerry while serving in Vietnam.86 USA Today reported, “Of the [Swift Boat]'s
254 members—out of 3500 swift boat sailors who served in Vietnam—only one served
under Kerry. The rest who did serve on Kerry's boats back his record.”87
¶29
Early in 2004, the Kerry campaign touted the senator’s military service, commonly
referring to the three Purple Hearts the senator received for his Vietnam service. For
public campaign events, they also gathered pro-Kerry veterans, many of whom had
served under Kerry on the swift boats.88 The publicity received by such events awakened
latent vendettas harbored by anti-Kerry veterans who were unhappy with the senator’s
war protests subsequent to his return from Vietnam and equally soured by his receipt of
three Purple Hearts for his service.89 One author reports that John E. O’Neill, a
longstanding adversary of Kerry’s who also served on the swift boats in Vietnam, and
Rear Admiral Roy F. Hoffman, head swift boat commander, gathered to discuss the best
manner in which to make the case for Kerry’s unfitness for the position of commanderin-chief.90 Angered by Kerry’s anti-war activism post-Vietnam, both men debated
whether it would be more effective to attack Kerry’s military record and awards, or to
focus on his anti-war activism.91
¶30
One participant in the early Swift Boat meetings explained the dilemma: “We all
agreed that John was unfit to be commander in chief. The only difference of opinion was
how to go about making the case: whether to focus solely on his [anti-war] testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committees in 1971 or to question his military
record as well.”92 The Swift Boaters heavily relied both on mass media coverage and the
82

May, supra note 30, at 68.
See Human Events Online, DNC Lawyers Work to Muzzle Swift Boat Vets’ Ads,
http://humaneventsonline.com.edgesuite.net/unfit_pdf.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
84
See, e.g., Swift Boat Veteran for Truth, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth Political Organization Report of
Contributions and Expenditures Form 8872, Second Quarter 2004,
http://forms.irs.gov/politicalOrgsSearch/search/Print.action?formId=13244&formType=E72 [hereinafter
Swift Boat Second Quarter Report 8872]; May, supra note 30, at 92–101.
85
Factcheck.org, Republican-funded Group Attacks Kerry’s War Record (Aug. 22, 2004),
http://www.factcheck.org/article231.html.
86
See Andrea Stone, Anti-Kerry Vets Say 'Lies' Drove Them to Act, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/president/2004-08-08-kerry-vets_x.htm.
87
Id.
88
See Patrick Healey, Vietnam Duality Challenges Kerry, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 2004, at A8.
89
Pamela Colloff, Sunk, TEX. MONTHLY, Jan. 2005, at 100.
90
May, supra note 30, at 85; see also Colloff, supra note 89, at 100.
91
Colloff, supra note 89, at 102.
92
Id. (quoting Dallas businessman Michael Bernique, who later dropped out of the Swift Boaters).
83
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publication of an exposé book by O’Neill to first disseminate information regarding
Kerry’s alleged falsities about his military service.93 Titled Unfit for Command,
O’Neill’s bestselling book argued that injuries Kerry suffered during service in
Vietnam—injuries which were arguably the reasons for the receipt of his first and third
Purple Hearts—were the result of self-inflicted wounds, not enemy attacks.94 O’Neill
argued that the details of Kerry’s rescue of fellow Swift Boat members cast him in a far
more heroic light than in reality.95 O’Neill relied on testimonial affidavits signed by
swift boat veterans as evidentiary sources.96 However, some of these affidavits have
since been retracted and serious uncertainty exists as to the proximity of many of the
Swift Boaters to Kerry’s rescue efforts in question.97 Importantly, both the television
commercials and alleged exposé book were strategically timed for release on August 11,
2004, which directly followed Kerry’s nomination acceptance speech at the Democratic
Convention in which he emphasized his military service.98
¶31
The first public disclosure filing of the Swift Boaters was posted on the IRS
website in the middle of July 2004—nearly two months after the group had announced
itself to the public during a May 2004 press conference.99 These Second Quarter reports
listed a combined $100,000 contribution from Bush’s longtime friend Karl Rove and
active Bush supporter Bob Perry, a Houston homebuilder, as well as a $25,000 gift from
Harlan Crow, trustee of the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation.100 Given how
late in the election the Swift Boaters had formed and how little funding the 527 had
received by the summer of 2004, the media disregarded the group as a viable factor in the
presidential race.101
¶32
However, the Swift Boaters received a total of $270,000 by the end of July 2004
from a handful of wealthy Texas oilmen who played a pivotal role in electing George
Bush as Governor of Texas.102 These donations remained unreported for two months due
to the IRS’s lax protocol for disclosure.103 Thus, when the Swift Boaters aired its first
93
See Peterson, supra note 32, at 776; see also May, supra note 30, at 83 (“[O’Neil] harbored a
longstanding animus toward Kerry dating from the early 1970s when Kerry was a leader of the anti-war
veterans.”).
94
See Editorial, Kerry Fit to Sue ‘Unfit’ Author, N.Y. POST, Nov. 18, 2004, at 10.
95
See id.
96
See Swift Boat Vets and POWs for Truth, “‘Any Questions?’ cover letter for TV station managers,”
http://www.swiftvets.com/article.php?story=20040808144320243 (last visited Apr. 14, 2010)
(referencing sworn affidavits from each veteran participant in the Swift Boaters’ advertisement entitled
“Any Questions?”); see also Factcheck.org, Republican-funded Group Attacks Kerry’s War Record (Aug.
22, 2004), http://www.factcheck.org/article231.html (providing hyperlinks to five Swift Boaters’ affidavits
in the left-most column).
97
See Factcheck.org, Republican-funded Group Attacks Kerry’s War Record (Aug. 22, 2004),
http://www.factcheck.org/article231.html (noting that Tour of Duty, a book by Douglas Brinkley,
“describes [the] rescue (and the sniper fire) as happening ‘several hundred yards back’ from where the
crippled PCF-3,” who Kerry allegedly rescued, “was lying, not ‘a few yards away,’ the distance from
which the anti-Kerry veterans claim to have witnessed the incident”).
98
May, supra note 30, at 99.
99
Wayne Slater, PI Digs into Kerry’s War Past, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 13, 2004, at A6.
100
See Swift Boat Second Quarter Report 8872, supra note 84; Wayne Slater, Texan Funds Anti-Kerry
Vets, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 23, 2004, at A10.
101
May, supra note 30, at 92–93.
102
Id. at 93.
103
See Wayne Slater, Texan Gives Anti-Kerry Vets Another $100,000, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18,
2004, at A17.
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television commercial in crucial key states, disclosure reports revealed Perry and Crow as
the only donors, omitting contributions from a significant amount of other Texas oilmen
with ties to the Bush family.104 During August 9–16, 2004, almost half of all cable
television viewers polled nationally reported having seen either the actual Swift Boater
commercial or news coverage of the ad, despite its broadcast in only three states—West
Virginia, Ohio, and Wisconsin.105 The survey’s director noted, “[t]he influence of this ad
is a function not of paid exposure but of the ad’s treatment in the free media,” which the
group largely relied on to disseminate the information to the national market.106 In
essence, the vast national dissemination of the Swift Boaters’ direct attacks against Kerry
was unprecedented. Local and national media outlets covered the advertisements, and, as
a result, these anti-Kerry ads made their way through the morning and evening news
circuits, attracting even more public attention.
¶33
Media coverage of the Swift Boater ad attacking Kerry’s service record helped to
elicit more contributions from donors through the internet, accumulating a total of nearly
$8 million.107 Wealthy donors, such as Perry, Pickens, and Simmons, contributed a total
of $10.5 million to the efforts by the end of the campaign.108 Nonetheless, the media had
difficulty linking the Swift Boat donors to the Bush family since contribution disclosures
lagged up to three months behind the circulation of Swift Boat advertisements and public
statements.109 Since the Swift Boaters were subjected to less frequent disclosure
deadlines than PACs and candidate committees, the additional round of contributions
remained undetected by the public for months after it was made.
¶34
As savvy as free-riding on media coverage was, the Swift Boaters even more
skillfully dodged Congress’s new disclosure time windows under the 2002 BCRA
reform, allowing their ads to seem more independent than if their conservative donors
had been publicly disclosed.110 The group’s second advertisement aired from August 14
to September 2, 2004, and focused its criticism on Kerry’s anti-war activism after his
return from Vietnam in the 1970s.111 This second ad was subject to the 2002 BCRA’s
new electioneering communications provision, which required disclosure for any
advertisements costing over $1000 that aired within sixty days of the general election, or
with thirty days of a primary or nominating convention, and pictured or referenced a
candidate.112
104

Id.
See Press Release, Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr., Cable and Talk Radio Boost Public Awareness of Swift
Boat Ad (Aug. 20, 2004), available at http://www.
annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Political_Communication/naes/2004_03_swiftboat-ad_0820_pr.pdf. The Swift Boat television ad can be viewed at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oObCOFiIrDc (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
106
Press Release, Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr., supra note 105.
107
Colloff, supra note 89, at 102, 167.
108
May, supra note 30, at 95–96. “The problem of lag-time in campaign finance disclosure reports is an
old one for journalists. . . . However, the 527 vehicle . . . exacerbates the problem for journalists
accustomed to candidate committees, political parties, or PACs who raised hard money more slowly
because of contribution limits. This new vehicle, which allows unlimited contributions, enables a
committee to ramp up quickly.” Id. at 96.
109
Id. at 97–98.
110
Id. at 68–69
111
Id. at 103. The Swift Boat television ad can be viewed at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=phqOuEhg9yE&feature=related (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
112
See FEC.gov, Electioneering Communications,
105
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¶35

Because of the varied timing of the Republican and Democratic conventions, each
party’s convention disclosure was different. While the Democratic convention window
for Kerry ads ran from June 26 to July 29, 2004, the Republican convention window for
Bush ads ran from July 31 to September 2, 2004.113 The FEC disclosure window for ads
that either pictured or referenced either candidate leading up to the general election began
on September 3, 2004, and ran through to the general election.114 By postponing their
attacks until August 5, 2004, the group circumvented the Democratic convention
“disclosure window” for ads that reference Kerry, set from June 26 to July 29, 2004, as
well as the sixty-day disclosure window for the general election. Ads triggering
disclosure during this time period would have linked the actions of T. Boone Pickens and
the Swift Boaters to the Bush family. Instead, their attacks coincided with “‘dark’
periods” of the new IRS public disclosure requirements which made it difficult for the
media to link Bush family cohorts with Swift Boaters—at least until after the election had
occurred.115 While the August ad fell within the Republican convention reporting time
window set from July 31 to September 2, 2004, the ad did not reference Bush and did not
require reporting during the Republican time frame.
¶36
It was not until a September 10, 2004 IRS disclosure report that both the Swift
Boaters’ $7 million of funding and the group’s connections to T. Boone Pickens and
other Texan financiers with ties to the Bush family were revealed.116 Despite this
revelation, one author points out that the mainstream media had already shifted its
attention away from Swift Boaters to cover liberal 527s’ counterattacks focusing on
Bush’s alleged “draft-dodging” antics.117 Thus, connections made between Bush and
Swift Boaters were treated as marginal and were not impressed upon the public as much
as the initial coverage revealing the Swift Boaters’ ads.118
¶37
Ultimately, the attacks on Kerry claiming that he had lied about the details of his
service to receive medals for valor were disavowed by the mainstream press.119 A
somewhat incomplete military record—attributable to the military’s administrative
oversight—supported Kerry’s account of the details, and testimony supplied by the Swift
Boaterer was often contradictory.120 Still, during August 2004, the public was unable to
discern who, in fact, was behind the Swift Boater brand and whether these individuals
were fueled by the mere issue of John Kerry’s service or by a greater objective to
expressly advocate on behalf of Bush. Regardless of the fact that several veterans
retracted their criticism of Kerry and that connections between Swift Boaters and Bush
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/electioneering.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
113
May, supra note 30, at 103–04.
114
Id. at 104.
115
Id. Since the ad did not fall under the electioneering communications provision because it aired after the
Democratic National Convention, the Swift Boaters did not have to submit the immediate dislocsures
required by the FEC under the electioneering provision. The submission of an electioneering
communications disclosure would have immediately revealed the most recent contributions in connection
with the Swift Boaters’ August advertisement. Instead, the Swift Boaters held off airing the second
advertisement until after the electioneering window had closed, which had the effect of delaying dislocsure
of their contributors until the standard IRS quarterly disclosure report released in September 2004.
116
Id. (citing Thomas B. Edsall, Swift Boat Group’s Tally: $6.7 Million, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2004, at
A5).
117
Id. (citing 60 Minutes II (CBS television broadcast Sept. 8, 2004)).
118
Id.
119
See Michael Kranish, Veteran Retracts Criticism of Kerry, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2004, at A1.
120
May, supra note 30, at 100–01.
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were eventually corroborated, the damage done to Kerry’s reputation and candidacy was
presumably irreversible.121
¶38
The lag in disclosure reports prevented media outlets from reporting the strong
connection between George W. Bush and the allegedly independent and issue-focused
Swift Boaters early on when such a report would have been most effective. The 527
loopholes of unlimited soft money contributions and delayed disclosure reports allowed
the group to broadcast highly effective anti-Kerry ads long before its financiers were
revealed to the public.
¶39
The events of 2004 have demonstrated that the FEC’s ex post regulation of 527s,
which relies on an examination of expenditures oftentimes months after they have been
made, is futile in an election setting. Evinced by the effective disclosure-dodging
strategies of the Swift Boaters and explicit candidate advocacy of MoveOn.org, the 2004
presidential election made an important case for stronger ex ante regulation of
independent political groups that goes beyond Congress’s 2000 reforms for 527s, as well
as the scope of BCRA.
IV. TIGHTENING THE 527 LOOPHOLES: A CALL FOR REFORM
¶40

As the Swift Boater account demonstrates, the special treatment of 527s began to
show its real perils during the 2004 presidential election. Subsequent to the election,
several legislators attempted to close the 527 loophole by lobbying the FEC to mandate
the registration of 527s as “political committees” under FECA, as BCRA was not
intended to address the status of 527s.122 Senator John McCain123 criticized the FEC for
its disregard of the express advocacy of some 527s on the Senate floor:
These [527] groups readily admit that their intended purpose is to
influence the outcome of Federal elections. FECA has long required these
groups to register as Federal political committees and comply with Federal
campaign finance limits . . . . But here we are, with these groups openly
flouting the law and openly spending soft money for the express purpose
of influencing the presidential election while the FEC sits on its hands
once again.124

¶41

Although McCain’s plea for wholesale, comprehensive 527 reform was not entirely
satisfied, the FEC did respond with significant regulatory reform in an attempt to prevent
the reoccurrence of a 527-dominated political field in future elections.

121

See Edward B. Foley & David Goldberger, The Swift Boat Ad: A Legal Analysis, in ELECTION LAW
@MORITZ, E-BOOK ON ELECTION LAW § 3.2 (Aug. 13, 2004),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part3/campaign_false02.html (speculating that Kerry might
have a viable libel lawsuit against the Swift Boaters for injury to his reputation).
122
Political Committee Status, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,736 (proposed Mar. 11, 2004) (codified at 11 C.F.R. pts.
100, 102, 104, 106, 114).
123
Sentator McCain was the 2008 Republican presidential nominee. He has served as a U.S. senator from
the State of Arizona since 1987.
124
150 CONG. REC. S4472 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain).

164

Vol. 5:1]

Lauren Daniel
A. FEC Reforms Re: 527 Regulation

¶42

Rather than requiring all 527s to register as “political committees” subject to strict
fundraising regulations, the FEC decided to render case-by-case determinations as to
whether a 527 was a “political committee” with express advocacy as its “major
purpose.”125 The FEC was careful not to redefine “political committees” so as to include
527s, as doing so would bar legitimate issue advocacy groups from tax-exempt status.126
Nonetheless, the FEC significantly amended its rules in late 2004 to limit, in three
distinct ways, the instances in which 527s could utilize soft money in electioninfluencing efforts.
¶43
First, the FEC chose to characterize as “contributions” any funds received from
contributors in response to a 527 communication that “indicates that any portion of the
funds received will be used to support or oppose the election of a clearly identified
Federal candidate.”127 Here it is important to recall the definition of a “political
committee” under BCRA: an organization with the “major purpose” of influencing
elections that receives “contributions” or makes “expenditures” in excess of $1000 per
calendar year.128
¶44
Consequently, the rule requires that all “contributions” received in this manner—
more or less with the donor’s expectation that they will be used to explicitly advocate for
or against a particular candidate—be subject to FEC caps similar to those imposed on
political committees.129 Currently, contributions that funnel into hard money accounts
for political organizations are capped at $5000 annually for any single contributor.130
The reforms also require 527s, which receive “contributions” used toward the election or
defeat of both state and federal candidates, to raise at least half of their finances with hard
money subject to the $5000 cap per donor.131
¶45
Second, the rules mandated that any advertisement referring to a specific political
party or candidate be funded by the sponsoring 527 with entirely hard money to which
the $5000 cap per donor is applied.132 In this manner, it appears as though the FEC was
attempting to carve out an isolated “political committee” feature within a 527 group. The
contributions that were received in response to express candidate advocacy
communications would be poured back into regulated accounts that continued to fund
125

See Political Committee Status, Definition of Contribution, and Allocation for Separate Segregated
Funds and Nonconnected Committees, 69 Fed. Reg. 68,056, 68,064–65 (Nov. 23. 2004) (codified at 11
C.F.R. pts. 100, 102, 104, 106). Note that the “major purpose” standard holds roots in the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the definition of “political committee.” See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
126
Feuer, supra note 73, at 944. As previously explained, a “political committee” under the FECA is
defined as an organization with a “major purpose” of express political advocacy that receives
“contributions” or makes “expenditures” in excess of $1000. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (2006); see also Buckley,
424 U.S. at 62–63.
127
FEC Scope and Definitions, 11 C.F.R. § 100.57(a) (2009); see also Political Committee Status,
Definition of Contribution, and Allocation for Separate Segregated Funds and Nonconnected Committees,
69 Fed. Reg. at 68,066.
128
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431(4); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 (declaring that 527s could legally avoid FEC
regulation so long as such outside groups refrain from using express advocacy “magic words,” such as
“vote” and “elect”).
129
See FEC Rules for Political Committee Status, 11 C.F.R. § 106.6(f)(1) (2009).
130
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2006).
131
See 11 C.F.R. § 100.57(b)(2).
132
See 11 C.F.R. § 106.6(f)(1).
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additional advertisements that explicitly advocated for a particular party or candidate.
The rule aimed to avoid the use of issue advocacy contributions to fund express advocacy
campaigns. This limitation did not, however, apply to publicity that referenced
candidates for state office.133
¶46
The FEC also sought to ensure that the issues for which 527s advocate are of
legitimate political concern with public appeal, rather than mudslinging tactics aimed to
defeat a particular candidate. To achieve this end, the third major reform adopted by the
FEC required all 527 groups, regardless of whether their advertisements and literature
directly reference federal candidates, to raise at least fifty percent of their expenditures
with hard, regulated money.134 The purpose of this requirement was to ensure that the
election issues for which 527s advocate are important to a large group of society,
warranting small contributions from a significant number of individuals, rather than to
the concentrated interests of a small group of wealthy donors.135
¶47
Combined, the FEC reforms make raising and spending money to advocate for
specific candidates far more difficult for 527s. In order to accept soft money donations,
which are recorded and made public by the IRS,136 527s cannot disclose to prospective
donors the particular candidates that the 527 supports.137 At face value, the reforms force
527s to limit their efforts to strict issue advocacy lest they be subject to the restrictive
fundraising rules governing hard money.
¶48
While undisputedly a significant change from the laissez-faire treatment 527s
enjoyed prior to 2005, the FEC reforms still allow outside groups to raise unregulated
soft money and ultimately influence the outcomes of campaigns. Some have argued that
the best method of closing the soft money loophole is to simply redefine the term
“political committee” under FECA and BCRA to include any group whose “major
purpose” is to influence the outcome of elections—certainly most 527s would fall under
this category, even if their efforts strictly consisted of issue advocacy.138 A competing
proposal, which provides for a more practical bright-line rule, suggests that the IRC be
amended to require every 527 group to register with the FEC as a “political committee,”
thus subjecting these groups to the same fundraising restrictions imposed upon candidate
committees and political party committees.139
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See 11 C.F.R. § 106.6(f)(2).
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See Feuer, supra note 73, at 944–45.
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The most recent of these attempts was a congressional bill titled the “527 Reform Act of 2007,”
introduced in January 2007 by Reps. Meehan, Shays, and Castle to the House of Representatives and by
Sens. McCain and Feingold to the Senate. H.R. 420, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007); S. 463, 110th Cong. § 2(a)
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Treasury under section 527(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 that it is to be treated as an
organization described in section 527 of such Code.” Id. The proposed bill exempted certain organizations
from the classification “political committee” that are required to pay tax for expenditures, “reasonably
anticipate” less than $25,000 of financing, are engaged exclusively in state and local (i.e., not federal)
elections. Id. However, the Reform Act died after being referred to the Committee on House
Administration in 2007.
134

166

Vol. 5:1]

Lauren Daniel
B. Adjudicating Complaints Against the 527s of 2004

¶49

It was not until November 2006 that the FEC began to settle through monetary
fines the various complaints against 527s that allegedly spent soft money on express
advocacy during the 2004 elections.140 The FEC’s amended rules rendered many of the
527s active in 2004 “political committees” by virtue of either: (1) their “expenditures”
used toward express advocacy, or (2) their requests for “contributions” through messages
indicating that such funds would be put toward the influence of elections.141 Notably, the
fines levied by the FEC on 527s were not the result of an ex post determination in the
sense that they were based on the post-election reforms that had not yet existed during the
2004 campaign season. Instead, the 527s active in 2004 had simply gambled on the fact
that the FEC would rely solely on the magic words test in Buckley—as the Commission
had done over the past decade—to determine whether 527s were “political
committees.”142 Instead, the FEC resurrected its far broader “reasonable interpretation”
express advocacy test,143 a standard the FEC adopted in response to a 1987 Ninth Circuit
decision, though rarely invoked.144
¶50
The FEC’s proceedings against 527s involved in the 2004 election demonstrated
how the agency’s recent reforms had effectively disposed of the magic words test of
advocacy in favor of a broader definition, which rendered any payment to produce a
broadcast “that could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as containing advocacy
of the election or defeat” of a candidate as an “expenditure” even in the absence of the
words “vote for” or “vote against.”145 Moreover, the FEC resolved to no longer rely on
any groups’ self-characterization as a 527, but rather to evaluate evidence such as
statements, contributors, and representatives to determine the group’s “major purpose.”146
¶51
These determinations had a great impact on the Swift Boaters, which were found
by the FEC to have violated the spirit of FECA by failing to register as a “political
140
Under FECA, the FEC may, upon “finding . . . probable cause to believe” that a violation of federal
campaign regulations occurred, “attempt to reach a tentative conciliation agreement with the [supposed
violator]” often involving monetary fines to be paid by the violator. 11 C.F.R. § 111.18 (2006) (codified at
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)).
141
Ryan, supra note 10, at 491.
142
Id. at 491–94; see also FEC Conciliation Agreement with Swift Boat Veterans and POWs for Truth, §
IV, ¶ 30 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter FEC Swift Boat Agreement], available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/
eqsdocs/000058ED.pdf (“While the Commission disagrees with its reasoning, SwiftVets contends that it
was uncertain as to the continued validity and application of the alternative express advocacy test set forth
in 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) because of: (1) SwiftVets' understanding of the First and Fourth Circuit court
decisions holding 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) unconstitutional; (2) SwiftVets' understanding of the
Commission's history of not relying on 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) in recent enforcement matters; (3) SwiftVets'
understanding of the division on the Commission in voting whether to initiate a rulemaking to revise or
repeal 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b); and (4) SwiftVets' understanding of the Commission's decision in 2004 not to
issue specific regulation regarding the political committee status of 527 organizations whose major purpose
was the nomination or election of Federal candidates (May 13, 2004), and its September 27, 2001 decision
to hold in abeyance a rulemaking to revise the definition of ‘expenditure’ and to promulgate a definition for
the ‘major purpose’ test.”).
143
See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b).
144
See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the “magic words” need not be
used to constitute express advocacy under the FECA; instead, the advocacy must, “when read as a whole,
and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an
exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate”).
145
See FEC Swift Boat Agreement, supra note 142, § IV, ¶ 25.
146
See FEC Conciliation Agreement With Freedom, Inc. (Oct. 31, 2006), available at
http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdoc/00005949.pdf.
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committee” with the FEC.147 In addition to making “expenditures” and receiving
“contributions” that indicated a use of such funds towards the defeat of Kerry’s bid for
the presidency, Swift Boaters had expressly advocated against Kerry despite the omission
of the magic words148:
The Commission concludes that all of these communications comment on
Senator Kerry’s character, qualifications, and fitness for office, explicitly
link those charges to his status as a candidate for President, and have no
other reasonable meaning than to encourage actions to defeat Senator
Kerry.
Therefore, because the Commission concludes that the
communications are “unmistakably, unambiguous, and suggestive of only
one meaning” and because reasonable minds cannot differ that the
communications urge Kerry’s defeat, the Commission concludes that they
are express advocacy . . . . According, the Commission concludes that
SwiftVets made expenditures in excess of $1,000 surpassing the statutory
threshold for political committee status.149
¶52

In reparation for unlawfully raising more than $22 million to influence the 2004
election,150 the Swift Boaters were ordered to pay a mere $299,500 in penalties to the
FEC.151 Similarly, the MoveOn.org Voter Fund was fined $150,000 for expressly
soliciting contributions to defeat George W. Bush under the guise of 527 status.152 While
many other 527s were required to pay penalties to the FEC, America Coming Together
(ACT), which raised a total of $103 million, made the largest payment of $775,000 to the
FEC for its illegal use of non-federal funds toward, among other purposes, its express
advocacy for John Kerry.153 The FEC collected a total of $3 million from
mischaracterized 527s and other tax-free or non-profit groups that were influential in the
2004 federal elections, and which continue to remain active in federal elections.154
¶53
Still, the FEC’s action against these 527s is likely to have little deterrent effect on
future conduct. First, the penalties levied by the FEC on 2004 independent groups
constituted a very small fraction of the unlawful money raised by such groups. The
rulings, thus, portrayed FEC fees merely as the cost of doing business, rather than a
deterrent to prevent 527s from exploiting campaign finance loopholes in the future.
Next, 527 complaints were settled a startling two years after the 2004 election—far too
late to impact the outcome of the 2004 election. Additionally, many claims against 527s
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See FEC Conciliation Agreement with America Coming Together (Aug. 24, 2007), available at
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in the 2004 election remained outstanding and unsettled beyond the 2006 midterm
elections.
¶54
The FEC’s refusal to recognize all 527s as “political committees” by promulgation
of new rules was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in Shays v. FEC, under the reasoning that a
great deal of deference must be given to agency decisions on whether or not to create or
alter existing regulations.155 In an effort to codify stricter 527 regulation than the FEC’s
mere case-by-case analysis, nearly every Congress since 2004 has attempted to amend
FECA’s definition of “political committees” to include 527 organizations involved in
federal elections so as to subject such groups to FEC disclosure requirements,
contribution limits, and donor prohibitions.156
C. Emily’s List v. FEC: A Step Back from Reform
¶55

On September 18, 2009, the D.C. Circuit delivered an unexpected blow to the
progress toward greater 527 regulation.157 In an opinion delivered by Judge Kavanaugh,
the court unanimously struck down the FEC’s 2004 527 reforms and ruled that
independent groups, including 527s, have a First Amendment right to raise and spend
funds freely to influence elections, so long as they do not coordinate their activities with a
specific candidate or political party.158 Weighing the government’s interest in deterring
the corruption that stems from unlimited contributions toward a candidate or party against
First Amendment rights to association and free speech, the court held that donations to
527s cannot corrupt candidates or elected officials.159 As Judge Kavanaugh noted, “to
the extent a non-profit . . . spends its donations on activities such as advertisements, getout-the-vote efforts and voter registration drives, those expenditures are not considered
corrupting, even though they may generate gratitude from and influence with
officeholders and candidates.”160
¶56
At specific issue in the case were the FEC’s three major 2004 reforms, namely 11
C.F.R. §§ 106.6(c), 106.6(f), and 100.57, which (1) require 527s to pay for at least half of
their election-related, non-express advocacy activities through hard money accounts
funded by individuals who have given no more than $5000 in a calendar year,161 (2) limit
the amount of money 527s can use to finance voter drives and public communications
that reference federal, and not state, candidates to the same limits imposed on PACs,162
and (3) restrict contributions received in response to solicitations indicating that such
contributions will be used for the express advocacy of a clearly identified federal
candidate to PAC limits of $5000 per individual.163 The court struck down all three of
these provisions, allowing 527s to return to their pre-2005 status in which they could
freely raise and spend money for election-related activities, including express advocacy
for or against a particular candidate. In his majority opinion, Judge Kavanaugh
155
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remarked, “non-profit groups—like individual citizens—may spend unlimited amounts
out of their soft-money accounts for election-related activities such as advertisements,
get-out-the-vote efforts, and voter registration drives.”164
¶57
While some advocates of campaign finance reform have accused the D.C. Circuit
of overreaching its authority in rendering an “overly broad” opinion,165 the decision is
certain to impact outside group involvement in future elections.166 As one reporter notes,
the decision opens the door even wider to outside anti-Obama conservative groups, such
as those which hosted “Tea Party” protests of big government in 2009, in advance of the
impending 2010 midterm elections and future 2012 presidential election.167
D. Beyond Emily’s List
¶58

As history demonstrates, 527s have always been able to align themselves with a
particular candidate in a manner that ostensibly appears to be zealous issue advocacy by
conveying a certain message through inference, rather than through language that
explicitly advocates for or against a federal candidate. However, Emily’s List remarkably
allows 527s to engage in blatant candidate advocacy and yet still remain free from caps
on contributions and expenditures. As the court states, its decision seeks to protect the
“right of citizens to band together and pool their resources as an unincorporated group or
non-profit organization in order to express their views about policy issues and candidates
for public office.”168 The decision virtually does away with any distinction between nonPAC 527s that engage in issue advocacy and express advocacy, respectively, since it
shields both categorizations from subjection to funding limitations.
¶59
Moreover, as one scholar notes, the decision also places political parties at a great
disadvantage since they are still subject to the hard money fundraising limits. Emily’s
List makes the regulatory treatment of 527s and PACs even more disparate, despite the
fact that the two entities both register under § 527 of the IRC. Registration under the
section gives the presumption that an organization’s purpose is to:
directly or indirectly accept[] contributions or mak[e] expenditures, or
both . . . . to influenc[e] or attempt[] to influence the selection,
nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal,
State, or local public office or office in a political organization, or the
election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors, whether or not such
individual or electors are selected, nominated, elected, or appointed.169
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¶60

Given that the two entities share the same tax-exemptions under § 527 of the IRC
and the same self-characterized objective—to influence federal and state elections—527s
should be subject to registration as “political committees” just like PACs and candidate
committees. Emily’s List supporters would respond that the traditional 527 groups,
despite their record of unlawful campaign conduct, have a greater claim to First
Amendment rights which separate them from political committees.
¶61
Perhaps others find something uniquely “American” in seeing small groups of
everyday individuals impact presidential elections, albeit through often negative
publicity. For example, when asked his opinion about the Swift Boaters smear campaign
in 2004, FEC Chairman Bradley Smith remarked, “I think it’s great that we live in a
country where 260 . . . average guys can go out and put their point of view out there
before the public and influence a major presidential race.” As one professor put it,
“Otherwise we all sort of go to sleep, and that’s bad for us.” However, both individuals
fail to see that it is also “bad” for us as citizens of a democracy to awaken to a political
field largely wrought by the smear campaigns of stealth outside groups.
1. If Emily’s List Sticks

¶62

If Emily’s List is not ultimately overruled and the 2005 FEC reforms remain
stricken, the FEC will simply have its hands tied in attempting to limit 527s activities in
any manner. Instead, full disclosure of financial disbursements and the identity of 527
contributors will remain as the exclusive method of 527 oversight. In this light, the
smear tactics of the Swift Boaters in an express advocacy-regulated regime may pale in
comparison to future 527 publicity campaigns in a regime entirely devoid of 527
regulation where express advocacy and issue advocacy are equally protected from
funding limitations. As one law professor has observed, under Emily’s List 527s “are
now free to accept unlimited contributions, to spend unlimited funds independently
supporting or opposing federal candidates.”170
¶63
Still the government had hoped to vitiate the Emily’s List precedent by prevailing in
Speechnow.org v. FEC, a similar case involving a 527 that was denied permission by the
FEC to accept unlimited donations for the purpose of express advocacy.171
Speechnow.org appealed the FEC’s denial of the request under the claim that its First
Amendment rights to free speech were violated by complying with funding limits.172 The
D.C. District Court ruled against Speechnow.org in July 2008, but the decision was
overturned by the D.C. Circuit in March 2010.173 The D.C. Circuit struck down limits on
individuals’ and corporations’ contributions to political committees for the purpose of
advocating for and against candidates so long as the political committee does not also
make direct contributions to candidates or political parties.174 Had the FEC prevailed en
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banc, the decision would have essentially overshadowed Emily’s List because Emily’s
List is an ordinary appellate decision issued by a standard three judge panel.
¶64
Speechnow.org and Emily’s List join the landmark 2010 Citizens United case, in
which the Supreme Court declared limitations on corporations’ independent spending for
the express advocacy of federal and state candidates unconstitutional, dramatically
altering the campaign finance landscape.175 Whereas the early 2000s were host to a
tightening of campaign finance loopholes that once allowed inside and outside political
groups to exercise a disproportionate influence over the election process, the subsequent
years have amplified such loopholes in the interest of First Amendment rights. These
recent federal court decisions illustrate what one scholar calls a recent “mov[ement]
toward a deregulated federal campaign finance system.”176
¶65
Emily’s List presents a major hurdle to 527 regulation reform. Still, many political
strategists are adopting a “wait-and-see” policy before advising independent groups to
disregard the new FEC regulations adopted after the 2004 election. In response to the
decision, a Democratic campaign finance lawyer remarked, “[i]n the short term, I don’t
think that any lawyer should advise their client that the law is gone and they need not
follow the current regulations.”177
2. If Emily’s List is Overruled
¶66

Despite recent court decisions favoring deregulation, Emily’s List may still be
overruled amid the high volume of campaign finance cases recently navigating the
judicial system. Should the judiciary ultimately permit regulation of independent groups,
a blanket requirement that all 527s register with the FEC and submit to the agency’s
oversight appears the only plausible solution to close the loopholes that allow outside
groups to use soft money for express candidate advocacy. Even if Emily’s List were
overturned and the FEC’s 2004 reforms were to stand, the distinction between 527s and
“political committees” no longer makes practical sense given the similarity of the groups’
conducts in candidate advocacy.
¶67
So long as the gray area between issue advocacy and express advocacy exists, 527s
will always strive to create the illusion of sheer issue advocacy—even if this means
creating candidate inferences without using explicit names or pictures—regardless of the
reality of the organization’s conduct. Anything short of requiring all 527s to submit to
FEC registration and contribution and spending limits fails to provide the requisite
predictability or clarity about the categorizations of 527s.
¶68
Moreover, while the “major purpose” test applied in FEC actions against 2004 527s
is superior to Buckley’s magic words standard, which focuses merely on the employment
of terminology, the major purpose test is often applied in an ex post manner though FEC
175
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527 adjudications occurring after the conclusion of the election (when public judgment
has already been impacted) as evinced by the Swift Boaters and the MoveOn.org Voter
Fund. Beyond having an unpredictable impact on 527 regulation, the non-bright-line
standard of the major purpose test does little to deter outside groups from testing their
limits at the onset of election-related activity. The FEC will first have to assess the
actions of a 527—its advertisement, contributors, and spokespeople—before it decides
that the 527’s major purpose is to advocate for particular candidates. Thus, the 527 will
get to play out its publicity campaign before its express candidate advocacy is
ascertainable. This “wait-and-see” 527 policy usually defers any FEC action against the
527 group until after the election’s conclusion, rendering FEC fines merely a
transactional cost in exploiting 527 soft money loopholes.
¶69
After 2004, both the lack of ex ante wholesale regulation of 527s and the FEC’s
issuance of meager penalties left many scholars and political pundits wondering whether
the 2008 presidential election would see a steady growth of these independent groups.
As one author posited, “It is possible that 527[s] . . . wishing to raise and spend illegal
soft money to influence the 2008 federal elections will take their chances with the FEC,
viewing a fine that amounts to one or two percent of the amount illegally raised and spent
as the cost of doing business.”178 However, despite the FEC’s failure to restrain 527
candidate advocacy, the role of 527s in this most recent 2008 presidential election
appears to have been somewhat diminished.
V. 527S IN THE 2008 ELECTION
¶70

Though political pundits held on to see whether independent groups would make a
final push in expenditures immediately before the 2008 presidential election, the role
played by 527s in the most recent presidential race between U.S. Senator John McCain
and then-Senator Barack Obama was distinctly muted in comparison to that in 2004. As
one reporter observed, “[I]f 2004 was the year of the 527 advocacy organization, 2008
will not produce a sequel.”179 The Center for Responsive Politics reports that 527 federal
expenditures in 2008 totaled just under $250 million—a startling drop off from the
$438.9 million spent in 2004.180 Possible reasons for this decline will be discussed in
Part VI of this Comment.
¶71
Although the FEC’s fines levied on 527s in 2004 were seen by most as nothing
more than the cost of doing business, some assert FEC sanctions as one possible basis for
the diminished participation of 527s in 2008.181 Another reason for the reduction of 527
activity could be attributed to both McCain’s and Obama’s publicly denouncement of 527
spending in light of the large loopholes that still exist in campaign finance laws.182 Still,
it is impossible to ignore the most likely explanation: the grave economic turmoil that
178
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shrouded the 2008 election and consequently left donors too concerned with their
plummeting portfolios to finance independent political groups.183
A. Democratic-Affiliated 527s
¶72

Despite an overall decline of 527 contributions and expenditures, some 527s were
still quite active during the 2008 election. Liberal groups, such as Brave New PAC, took
matters into their own hands to “spread the word about McCain” since “it’s clear the
corporate media won’t.”184 This group sought to disseminate information about
McCain’s alleged short temper and volatile nature through a television advertisement
featuring a former prisoner of war (POW) familiar with McCain who stated that the
emotionally disturbing POW experience is “not a good prerequisite” for the position of
commander-in-chief.185
¶73
The left-wing MoveOn.org Voter Fund, which was active in 2004, also returned for
a second round of attacks on the Republican nominee in its portrayal of McCain as a
mere conduit of special interests, as well as a candidate who took an unpopular stance on
the Iraq war.186 Similarly, VoteVets ran advertisements speciously suggesting that
McCain would reinstate the military draft if elected.187
¶74
Other 527s aligned with then-Senator Obama include the California Nurses
Association, which aired its one “heartbeat away” advertisement in an attempt to unnerve
the public by focusing on McCain’s selection of the “inexperienced” Alaska Governor
Sarah Palin as his running mate.188 The advertisement aired in traditional swing states,
such as Ohio and Wisconsin.189
B. Republican-Affiliated 527s
¶75

Despite the fact that liberal 527s have traditionally outspent their conservative
counterparts, right-wing 527s aggressively advocated against the election of Barack
Obama.190 Vets for Freedom featured an ad campaign attacking Obama’s position that
183
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the troop surge in Iraq has been a failure.191 The advertisement juxtaposed clips of
Obama’s stump speeches with footage of General Petraus, in which Petraus asserts that
the surge had actually brought more stability to the region.192
¶76
A common theme among conservative 527 attack ads was Obama’s status as a
former congregant of the controversial Reverend Jeremiah A. Wright’s church in
Chicago. The California-based Our Country Deserves Better PAC ran an ad referencing
the “hateful sermons” of Reverend Wright.193 The same group also ran ads featuring the
mother of an Iraq Marine who alleged that “[Obama] says he’ll play nicey-nice with
Islamic militants who want to kill Americans both here at home and abroad.”194
¶77
While the presence of 527s remained palpable in the 2008 presidential race, the
arena did not appear to be dominated by any single group as was the case in 2004 with
the Swift Boaters and MoveOn.org Voter Fund. Evan Tracey, president of the Campaign
Media Analysis Group, argues that 527s have changed their method to focus on the
“message,” not necessarily on “tonnage”195 by producing fewer, yet more effective and
persuasive, advertisements. In essence, by focusing on a handful of politically
fluctuating districts within several swing states, 527s are able to get more “bang for their
buck” than broadcasting nationwide advertisements in markets that have clearly favored
Obama or McCain in voter polls.
C. A New Breed: The 501(c)s
¶78

Some pundits assert that 527s have not so much disappeared as they have evolved
into a new breed—nonprofit, “social welfare” groups.196 A study conducted by the
Campaign Finance Institute found that 501(c)(4) social welfare groups,197 (c)(5) labor
unions,198 and (c)(6) business leagues199 disbursed at least three times as much money as
they did in 2004 or 2006.200 One paper reports that the St. Louis-based American Issues
Project (AIP), which aims to promote “conservative values,” has emerged under IRC
501(c)(4) as a new vehicle to press a conservative agenda with less regulation than
traditional 527s.201 The AIP was one of the first sources to link Democratic presidential
candidate Barack Obama with William Ayers, a former member of the radical Weather
Underground, in television ads.202 The ad was funded primarily by Harold Simmons, a
McCain donor and former supporter of the Swift Boaters. In response, Obama called for
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an investigation of the group by the Department of Justice to determine whether the
501(c)(4) was merely a political committee, subject to soft money limits, in disguise.203
¶79
501(c)(4)s, named for the section of IRC which sanctions them, are social welfare
organizations which can lobby without contribution limits so long as the topic of the
lobbying directly relates to the organization’s tax-exempt purpose.204 Such organizations
can also raise and spend money to influence the outcome of federal and state candidate
elections so long as the candidate advocacy does not constitute the primary purpose of the
501(c)(4).205 As the section under which lobbying groups and ballot initiative
committees are often registered, 501(c)(4)s do not allow their contributors to claim tax
deductibility for their donations.206 Typically such organizations, along with their sibling
501(c)(5) labor unions and 501(c)(6) business leagues, are allowed to engage in political
activity under applicable 501(c) rules without disclosing the identity of their donors to the
public.207
¶80
Alluding to the tactics of Swift Boaters in 2004, one 2008 activist observed, “[a] lot
of these [501(c)(4)] groups don’t get started until [late in the campaign] and they don’t
report until October, so it’s hard to know exactly what they’re doing.208 Moreover, he
expressed concern over the less stringent disclosure requirements for 501(c)(4)s, stating
that “we may never know” the extent of their activity in influencing the presidential
race.209
VI. ASSESSING THE DECLINE OF 527 ACTIVITY IN 2008
¶81

While the FEC’s 2005 “wait-and-see” reforms appear to be as easily circumvented
as the magic words articulated in Buckley, 527s played a significantly diminished role in
the 2008 presidential election. In 2004, the ten largest contributors to Democratic and
Republican organizations gave more than $100 million to outside political groups during
the Bush/Kerry election.210 By contrast, the ten contributors in 2008 donated only $30.4
million to outside groups during the McCain/Obama election.211
¶82
The diminished role in outside group activity has been attributed to three main
reasons. First, the reduction of 527s’ presence in 2008 may be a consequence of both
McCain’s and Obama’s public denouncement of 527 spending in light of the large
loopholes that still exist in campaign finance laws.212 McCain and Obama both
denounced the large expenditures made by 527s for unregulated sprees of negative
203
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campaigning.213 Similarly, for fear of appearing hypocritical, both candidates avoided
coordinating their campaign publicity efforts with 527s that launched negative publicity
against each candidate’s opponent. Second, while most agree that the fines levied by the
FEC in the aftermath of 2004 were far too insignificant to have any deterrent effect for
groups seeking to exploit soft money loopholes, political pundits have sometimes cited
the “legal gray cloud” over 527 activity since the FEC levied sanctions in 2004 as one
possible basis for the decline of 572s in 2008.214 Lastly, the devastating economic
recession that coincided with the 2008 election may have been the most significant factor
in the decrease of 527 spending in 2008.
A. Candidate Denouncements of 527s
¶83

One plausible explanation posited for the reduced role of 527s in 2008 is that both
presidential candidates denounced the alleged illegal spending by such groups. 527
contributions and expenditures demonstrated signs of decline early on when both Senator
McCain and then-Senator Obama discouraged their supporters from donating to these
groups notorious for exploiting regulation loopholes in 2004. As one media outlet
explained, such conduct by highly unregulated organizations “run[s] counter to the
reformist images both candidates were attempting to burnish.”215 A more cynical take on
their denouncements is that the candidates wanted to channel money to their own
campaigns in order to have more control over the field of political publicity. As Joe
Scarborough noted on his MSNBC morning talk show:
You know . . . telling people not to give money to 527s is also a wise
political move. Because you go back to 2004, and you see the John Kerry
campaign and you see all of these 527s that were shooting from all
directions. It wasn’t coordinated. And in the end, a lot of people looked
back and wrung their hands and said, Why did we do that? This makes so
much more sense. It’s a much smarter political move. And it also does
stop this [sic] sleazy third-party attacks.216

¶84

Scarborough’s argument is that a candidate wants to stay on message in conveying
a certain image to the public. The saturation of 527s into the media airwaves, even 527s
that might be supportive of said candidate, inevitably meddles with the image that a
candidate attempts to impress upon the public. Essentially, a candidate wants to retain
full control of the message being conveyed to the public and even 527s advocating on his
or her behalf detracts from this control.
¶85
Interestingly, a popular political blog reported during the early fall of 2008 that the
Obama campaign had retreated from its initial denouncement of 527s in the last few
months of the campaign.217 The campaign let Obama supporters know that support of
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such groups was welcome—especially as a counterattack against conservative 527s
which had pooled a significant amount of contributions.218 A senior advisor to Obama
denied such acquiescence with 527 activity and admitted that the campaign discouraged
527 contributions, in part, to encourage direct campaign donations.219
B. FEC Crackdown in 2004
¶86

While scholars seem to agree that the deterrent effects of the FEC’s fines in 2004
were likely minimal,220 political news correspondents have oftentimes attributed the
decline of 527 activity in the 2008 election to the penalties levied on 527s in 2004.221
One political blogger observed that “[t]he legal environment is much tougher in 2008
than it was in 2004.”222 In actuality, FEC fines amounted to only a tiny fraction of the
total amount 527s raised and spent in 2004. While the stigma of violating campaign
finance rules may deter some groups looking to exploit FEC loopholes, the size of the
penalties levied in 2004 hardly provides a disincentive for groups in this election cycle.
As a campaign spokesperson for a candidate in Colorado’s 4th Congressional District
observed, the legal consequences 527s face “aren’t steep consequences . . . so many just
bite the bullet and pay fines but continue their actions.”223 As a result, the FEC fines of
2004 are an unlikely explanation for the decrease of 527 presence in 2008.
C. The Backdrop of Economic Turmoil

¶87

It would be imprudent to discuss the financial outlay during the 2008 election
without accounting for the tremendous economic turmoil that coincided with the final
months leading up to Election Day 2008. The 2008 election took place less than two
months after the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and the
U.S. Federal Reserve was forced to bail out American International Group (AIG), along
with many other major financial institutions. The announcement of the filing was
followed by a freeze in credit markets and a startling plunge in stock prices. According
to the U.S. Commerce Department’s report issued in the spring of 2009, the U.S. gross
domestic product shrank 3.9% from spring 2008 to spring 2009, indicating the worst
decline since the Great Depression.224 Because most contributions to independent groups
218
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are made within the final month or two of a campaign season, the economic distress in
the fall of 2008 had a significant impact on 527 funding.
¶88
One Republican fundraising consultant explained how acute of an impact the
economic turmoil had on the last few months of the general election:
After the [GOP] convention, things looked good. Major donors interested
in issue advocacy were tuned in, political juices were flowing, polling
looked good, and then blammo! Most donors lost 20 or 30 percent of their
net worth in eight days. With few exceptions, that pretty well shut down
the money discussion for a lot of folks.225
¶89

As of October 18, 2008—just three weeks before the 2008 election—the media
reported a $113 million drop in 527 expenditures.226 Illustrative of this reality was the
conservative Freedom Watch, which had plans to spend as much as $200 million on
federal elections with the assistance of billionaire casino financier Sheldon Adelson.227
After a strong start of $30 million in 527 expenditures and an ad campaign highlighting
Bush’s effective war strategy, the market began its downward spiral.228 Adelson was
reported to have lost $4 billion of his private fortune even before the market’s lowest dip
in early October.229 The organization played a far less pivotal role in the 2008
presidential race than initially anticipated.230
¶90
The story behind Freedom Watch was all too common among 527s in the 2008
election cycle and remains the most plausible explanation for 527 decline in 2008. In
fact, MoveOn.org—the liberal organization that heavily relied on individual donors for
soft money—adapted to the frail economic landscape by collecting hard money within
the legal limits set out by the FEC for individual contributors.231 Large donations in the
form of unregulated soft money from individual wealthy donors became less feasible in
the tough economic times surrounding the 2008 election. Instead, contributions were
more readily available in the form of small donations within the $5,000 per individual
hard money limit from a larger sector of the public. While some might argue that
MoveOn.org shifted tactics to avoid FEC-imposed fines, hard money had simply become
a more viable solicitation method in 2008’s down-economy than in previous elections.
However, it did not substantially trump large individual donations.232 The FEC’s
imposition of fines equivalent to approximately one to two percent of an organization’s
expenditures simply places a tax on 527s that dubiously raise limitless soft money for
express advocacy.
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D. Alternate Outside Group Vehicles
¶91

Financial disclosures from the 2008 election cycle demonstrate that 501(c) groups
have actually closed the gap between the diminished role of 527s in 2008 versus their
role in 2004. By law, 501(c)s can engage in the same conduct as 527s so long as
“partisan campaign activity,” as defined by the IRS, does not become their “primary”
function.233 Moreover, 501(c)s can engage in explicit advocacy for or against a candidate
so long as their activities are not financed by corporations or union organizations.234
Unlike 527s, disclosure requirements for 501(c)s are far more lax, requiring reporting of
only a minimal amount of expenditures and allowing information about contributors to
remain relatively unreported.235
¶92
While the focus of 501(c)s, such as the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, National Rifle Association, and America’s Agenda: Health Care for
Kids Inc., has been largely at the congressional level, such organizations aired an
increasing number of ads attempting to affect the outcome of federal elections.236 Even
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a 501(c)(6) designated organization, spent more than
$20 million in 2008 for candidate advocacy purposes.237
¶93
Just as 527 regulation has been challenged by the recent Emily’s List decision, so
too have similar cases challenged new restrictions on the amount of money corporations
and labor unions can spend in federal elections. As mentioned in Part IV, Citizens United
v. FEC sought to determine whether corporations and labor unions have the same First
Amendment free speech protections as individuals to engage in political debates during
elections without government censorship.238 In 2008, the D.C. District Court sided with
the FEC in finding that a documentary critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, which was
produced by Speechnow.org and aired close to the 2008 Democratic National
Convention, violated the provision in the McCain-Feingold Act restricting
“electioneering communications” thirty days before primaries.239 However, in January
2010, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision and declared that nonprofit and for-profit corporations are able to use their general treasuries toward express
advocacy of state and federal candidates.240 This landmark decision overturns a strong
tradition of prohibiting corporations’ express advocacy out of fear over the impact such
advocacy would have on the political process. The decision marks a decisive step toward
the deregulation of campaign finance—a trend that will almost certainly secure a future
of unregulated soliciting and spending by 527s.
VII.
¶94

CONCLUSION

The FEC’s reforms concerning the treatment of 527s in late 2004 provided a
starting point for closing the loopholes that permit limitless money to be spent for
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candidate advocacy. Still, the FEC’s failure to promulgate regulations that would subject
527s to contribution limits from the point of the groups’ inception has sent the message
that the circumvention of campaign finance laws is permissible. The FEC’s case-by-case
analysis of 527s—often years after the relevant election has come to fruition—has
provided unclear directives on how independent groups should proceed in a post Swift
Boat era. Additionally, the FEC’s 2004 rules “wait to see” whether the publicity
campaigns of outside groups embody the express advocacy that warrants monetary caps,
rather than requiring prophylactic solicitation and spending limits up front. As the 2004
presidential election illustrated, a reactive “wait-and-see” approach invites injury to the
electoral process before the FEC can intervene and remedy 527 malfeasance.
¶95
Most problematic, however, is the 2009 Emily’s List decision of the D.C. Circuit
which precludes any expectation of 527 regulation beyond disclosure mandates. So long
as Emily’s List stands, FEC regulations that require 527s to pay for a large amount of
election-related activity out of hard money accounts, as well as limit contributions for the
purpose of express advocacy to $5000, will be deemed unconstitutional. Until the
judiciary permits the FEC to require registration of 527s identical to that of political
committees, such groups will continue to wreak havoc in the political arena, often
engaging in misleading and harmful advertisement campaigns that skew the public’s
perception of political candidates.
¶96
While a decline of 527 activity in the 2008 president election led many analysts to
suggest that the FEC succeeded in frightening some outside groups into retirement or,
alternatively, incentivized them to rely on hard money contributions,241 these analyses are
likely erroneous. Sanctions levied by the FEC in 2004 were de minimis and likely
incapable of effectively deterring 527s’ circumvention of campaign finance laws.
Candidate denouncement of the activities of 527s also continued to be an ineffective
deterrent; such declarations have little effect on the outside groups that have become
institutional to the American political process. The most probable reason for the decline
in 527 activity was the catastrophic downturn in the economy surrounding the 2008
presidential election, which drained 527s of their finances. However, the economic
recession only temporarily reduced 527 expenditures.
¶97
Without lasting reform closing 527 contribution loopholes, individuals looking to
circumvent campaign finance regulations will continue to exploit these organizations’
tax-free status and evade contribution limitations. The Emily’s List ruling exacerbated
the 527 loopholes, and the decision is “going to make it harder to constrain the role of
influence-seeking money in federal campaigns.”242 Moreover, future elections are likely
to host far more negative publicity than in the past due to the decision’s likely
provocation of a 527 proliferation. Since Emily’s List deemed impermissible any
restrictions on 527s’ right to raise and spend money freely, such groups need only to
comply with disclosure requirements, rather than the monetary caps implemented by the
FEC in late 2004. This substantial relaxation of 527 regulation will not only encourage
existing 527s to strengthen their involvement in elections, but it is also likely to
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encourage the formation of new outside groups seeking to exercise an unrestrained
influence over the political process.243
¶98
Going forward, the judiciary must allow Congress to take immediate and drastic
action to enact comprehensive reform, such as that proposed in the 527 Reform Act of
2007 that treats 527s identically to political committees,244 and to close the 527 loophole
once and for all. When the 527 loopholes are closed, Congress should use the regulations
imposed on issue advocacy groups as a model to regulate 501(c) spending, since outside
groups have begun to shift to using 501(c)s as a vehicle to achieve the same goals as
those of 527s. Congress would be remiss to stand idle while special interest groups use
501(c)s to parrot the 527 loopholes.
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